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IN THE. SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
HENRI NIEMANN, MARIA NIEMANN, RENATE NIEMANN, by
her guardian ad litem Henri Niemann, and HENRI NIEMANN JR.
by his guardian ad litem Henri Niemann,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No. 8670

vs.
GRAND CENTRAL MARK E TSUGARHOUSE, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

.•

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the
record. The parties will be referred to here as they appeared in the trial court).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant for damages sustained by
plaintiffs from trichinosis caused by eating ground beef
infested with trichinae and sold by defendant to plaintiffs on June 24, 1955. The judgment w.as entered upon
a verdict returned by a jury.
The case was submitted to the jury upon the propositions that if the jury found the ground beef was inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fested with trichinae and caused plaintiffs to suffer
trichinosis then there was either a breach of warranty
as set forth in Section 60-1-15, Subdivisions 1 and 2,
·utah c·ode Annotated, 1953, or a violation of Sections
-!-20-5 and 4-20-8, Subdivisions 5 and 7, referring to foods,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Defendant has made an inaccurate statement of the
facts and has failed to take into consideration the well
established rule that in considering a verdict of a jury
the evidence must be viewed in the light most strongly
in favor of that party in whose favor the verdict was
returned. This verdict was for plaintiffs and therefore
in reviewing the evidence we will follow that rule and
~tate the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs.
Defendant only raises two points. The first point
relates to the sufficiency of the evidence and the second
point to the giving of an instruction and the failure to
give a requested instruction.
Rather than revie\v the testimony both under the
staten1ent of the ease and under the point \Yhere it will
be involved, \Ve \viii Inerely discuss the eYidence under
the point where it is relevant.
STATEI\IENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TESTIMONY SUSTAINS A FINDING THAT DEFENDANT SOLD TO PLAINTIFF GROUND BEEF INFESTED WITH TRICHINAE.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION
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NO. 5 AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION N~O. 9.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TESTIMONY SUSTAINS A FINDING THAT DEFENDANT SOLD TO PLAINTIFF GROUND BEEF INFESTED WITH TRICHINAE.

lTnder the first point in its Brief defendant merely
attacks the finding which the jury made that defendant
sold ground beef to plaintiffs which was infested with
trichinae. By Instruction No. 3 the jurors were instructed
as follows ( 79) :
INSTRUCTION NO. 3
"In order for the plaintiffs, of (sic) any of
them, to recover in this ,action, they must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence the following:
1. That the ground beef purchased by Mr.
Niemann from the Grand Central Market, the
defendant herein, contained sausage, which was
infected with trichina.
2. That the plaintiffs, or any one or more
of them, ate such ground beef containing sausage
.so infected and contracted trichinosis therefrom.
3. That the plaintiffs, or any one or more
of them, were made ill and sustained damages to
their person by the disease mentioned above, as
trichinosis."
The evidence clearly points to the ground beef purchased from defendant as being the cause of the trichinosis suffered by plaintiffs. We reach this result through
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a process of elimination as well as a process of considering the persons who became infested with trichinosis and
the severity of that infestation. We start with the indisputable and admitted f.act that the four plaintiffs became
ill with trichinosis (234, 243 and 244). The next
established fact is that trichinosis can only come, so far
as practical here, from pork which has not been properly
treated to kill trichinae ( 242). Trichin.ae is eliminated
from pork either by cooking, freezing, or using a salt
process (213, 214).
Symptoms from trichinosis usually becoine apparent
to the victim from seven to fourteen days after ingestion
of the meat and it may be within t"'. . o days or as long as
four weeks (246). The testimony establishes that on Friday, June 24, 1955, Mr. and Mrs. Niemann went to the
d~fendant's place of business between 8 .and 9 o'clock
at night (127, 156). They purchased fruit, potatoes,
beans, liver, lamb necks, wieners and ground beef (137).
Upon arrival at home Mrs. Niemann prepared the ground
beef. It was not put in the refrigerator (156, 183). In
preparing thi.s ground beef bread spread she put the
ground beef in a bowl, put salt and pepper on it, cut an
onion real fine, broke an egg over it and mixed it all together. It was then spread on bread (127, 170). ~Irs.
Niemann ate three slices 'vith this spread on it, ~lr.
Niemann t'vo, the son I-Ienri one and the daughter Renate
1nerely took a taste of the spread "~ith a fork (162). There
was some left over and the next day

~Irs.

finished that (163). Shortly after noon on
July

~'

Nie1nann
Saturda3~,

the Nien1ann fa1nily left for an outing at Bear
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Lake (128). On Sunday evening, July 3, Mr. Niemann
did not feel very well (163). On Monday morning, July 4,
1\ir.s. Niemann became ill (163). Their symptoms were
the typical symptoms of trichinosis, including fever,
chills, headaches, sore eyes, ect. (126, 163, 164). Because of their illness the family left before they had
planned to do so. They left on the morning of the 4th
and arrived at home at approximately 1:00 P.~f. (129,
163). It will be observed that Mr. Niemann came down
with trichinosis nine days after ingesting the ground
beef purchased .at defendant's store. Mrs. Niemann came
down within ten days of eating the meat. These are both
within the usual limits within which symptoms appear
after ingesting trichinae infested meat. The son, Henri,
first noticed an illness coming on on Saturday, July 9
(176). This was within fifteen days of eating the meat
and within the limits placed by Dr. King on symptoms
becoming evident. Renate became sick two or three days
after Henri (183). This also puts her within the limits
as indicated by Dr. King.
The Niemanns had a son by the name of Niels who
did not eat .any of the ground beef spread. He did not
get trichinosis (127, 173). Also, Mrs. Niemann's mother
did not eat any of this spread and she did not become
ill with trichinosis (128, 173).
Also, it is to be noted that the severity of the cases
\vas dependent upon the amount of this ground beef which
each of the members of the family ate. Mrs. Niemann ate
the most, she had the severest case (242) and, as a matter
of fact, was confined in the hospital for two weeks (165).
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Mr. Niemann ate next to the most and his ca.se was the
next in severity (242). Henri's case was less severe and
he ate only one slice of bread with this spread on it.
Renate was the next in line and she had the least severe
case ( 242). All this, as indicated above, was in accordance with the amount of this spread ingested by each
of these parties.
This was the only uncooked meat eaten by the Niemanns (129). The other meats eaten during the time
when the Niemanns could have been infested consisted
of lamb necks, liver and wieners (136, 137, 15±). The
only type of pork eaten before contracting trichinosis was
some mettwurst purchased from !filler's by Carla
Schnibbe and given to the Kiemanns the lOth day of l\Iay
(137, 155, 188, 189). This \Yas some 53 days, or 7¥2 weeks
before symptoms of trichinosis became e\ident. In any
event Niels, the grandmother, and the Schnibbe family
ate from this ring of mettwurst and none of them contracted trichinosis (156, 157, 190). The Niemanns had
purchased no pork (141). They had never eaten any uncooked pork (1±2).
The foregoing facts created a hard core of evidence
establi.shing that defendant had sold the plaintiffs the
infested 1neat. This evidence \Yas in1pervious and innnune
to any atten1pts by defendant to lessen its effectiveness
to establish plaintiffs' case.
This evidence alone \Yonld justify the finding of the
jury in accordance \Yith Instruction No. 3, supra, that
defendant sold the infested n1eat to plaintiffs causing
thent to .suffer trichinosis. Plaintiffs took a further
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step in proving their case and introduced evidence showing that there was opportunity at defendant's place of
business for the ground beef to contain pork sausage.
It appeared from the evidence that defendant .at its
place of business used only one grinder in preparing its
ground meat (194). Also, the same pans were used in
handling both ground beef and ground pork (195). The
method in which ground meats were produced was described by Edwin R. Benzon, who during June of 1955,
was the meat market manager .at the store where plaintiffs purchased the ground beef. During June of 1955,
three butchers vvere working under Mr. Benzon. The man
arriving at 8 :00 in the morning would proceed with the
grinding (204). Beef would first be ground and then
sausage. Ordinarily, it would not be necessary to make
any further sausage on .any particular day inasmuch as it
was made only two or three days a week. However, beef
1night be ground on more than one occasion and on Friday and Saturday it might be ground five or six times
after the original batch was made up (205). Contrary
to defendant's contention this means that beef was ground
after sausage on the same day (200). Hence, it can be
seen that opportunity existed for beef to be adulterated
'vith sausage if great care was not used in cleaning this
one grinder. This was admitted by Benzon when he testified a.s follows ( 205, 206) :

"Q. Are there ways which sausage could get into
beef~

A.

Intentionally, or

Q.

Otherwise~

otherwise~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

A. No.
Q. If the machine were not completely washed,
could it~
A. Yes, if it wasn't washed, yes."
LaMont Richins, the meat supervisor for defendant,
who had never heard of trichinosis (195) did not eliminate the fact that this adulteration might occur. He
testified as follows ( 195) :
Now, could sausage, some particles of sausage be left in the grinder~
A. I doubt that very much.
Q. Could it be~
A. I doubt it."
As might be expected these employees of defendant
stated that on all occasions the machines ,,-ere thoroughly
washed, but the jury did not need to believe that all particles of sausage were removed perfectly on every occasion. The witnesses who testified admitted that men
under them did the grinding and they 'vere not al\\-ays
present ( 207). Certainly in view of the testimony of
the purcha.se of the ground beef and the resulting trichinosis a jury could find that the ground beef contained
some of this sausage. A very s1nall an1ount of this sausage could have caused the infestation suffered by these
plaintiffs. Defendant's pathologist, Dr. John I-I. Carlquist, testified that an ounce of sausage could haYe in it
100,000 larvae (29±). This is contrary to the stateinent
in defendant's brief that a s1nall particle of sausage could
not cause infestation. A housewife 1nerely tasting ra"sausage in 1ninute quantities to check seasoning could
become heavily infected ( 219, 220).
"Q.
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Richins testified that immediately after using the
grinder it was cleaned (193, 194). However, Benzon
testified that the night shift, consisting of one man, usually cleaned up and that the grinder was left for him to
clean unless it had been cleaned otherwise (205). This
slight discrepancy in te.sti1nony indicates that the manager
and supervisor could not possibly keep accurate check
on exactly what was happening in connection with the
cleaning of this grinder and further strengthened the
opportunity for the ground beef to contain pork sausage.
A case in point isM our en v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 139 N.Y.S. 2d 375 (affirmed in the Intermediate
Court of Appeals 1 A.D. 2d 767, 148 N.Y.S. 2d 1 and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 1 N.Y. 2d 884, 136
N.E. 2d 715). The facts and law in that case are better
explained by the words of the court:
"The plaintiff husband and wife bought and
cooked some ground round beef at one of the
stores of the defendant in New York County. It
is alleged the beef had been contaminated through
the negligence of the defendant by allowing the
residue of previously chopped pork to become
mixed with it and as a result of contamination,
both of the plaintiffs contracted trichinosis.
"The defendant through the examination before the trial of the supervisor in its meat department, parts of which examination were read into
the record on the trial, conceded in detail that it
had two Hobart grinding machines and that both
of them were used for grinding beef and pork.
It is alleged by the plaintiff that after each grinding there is a residue of the meat ground left in
the machine. In the examination before the trial,
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the supervisor of the meat department of the defendant stated whichever machine is used to grind
pork is cleaned out before the beef is ground in
l•t

0

***

"I find from my research, it is generally conceded that the trichinella spiralis which is the
cause of the disease known as trichinosis is not
usually associated with meat known .as beef. ***
"The physician who originally attended the
plaintiffs, diagnosed the illness as trichinosis.
The same diagnosis was determined by the physician at the New York Hospital where l\Irs. Mouren
was for ten days. Mr. :Jiouren was not hospitalized. It is alleged Mrs. :Jiouren is still suffering
from the effects of trichinosis. It seems to me,
from the testimony that we may exclude all possibilities of infection to the plaintiffs, other than
the beef which was purchased from and ground
by the defendant, for the plaintiffs had not eaten
pork since some time in July when two small cans
of boiled ham were purchased. \\-:nen a purchaser
of pork kno"\YS he is buying pork, he can protect
himself from the infection by thoroughly cooking
the meat. Not knowing there "\Ya.s pork in the n1eat,
it was cooked as hamburger and served rare on
Saturday on "\Yhich the n1eat "\Ya.s purchased and on
the follo"\Ying day. The plaintiffs kept the meat
in an electric refrigerator known as Frigidaire.
said to be manufactured by the General ~rotors
Corporation, until 1\Irs. :\Iouren "\Yas prepared to
cook it, on both Saturday~ Septen1her 20, 1952 and
Sunday, Septe1nber ~1, 1~)32. In the sale of me.at
by the defendant to the plaintiff husband, there
was an implied "Tarranty that it "\Yas fit for hun1an
consumption. I find as a n1atter of la"\v that the
in1plied \Y.arranty extended to the benefit of the
plaintiff wife. See Bo\Yinan v. Great . .:\.tlantie &
Pacific Tea Co., 28± App. Div. 663, 133 N.Y.S. 2d
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904; \:isusil v. W. T. Grant Co., 253 App. Div. 736,
300 N.Y.S. 2d 652."
Another case which i.s closely in point is Flynn v.
First r..rational Stores, Inc., 296 Mass. 521, 6 N.E. 2d 814,
wherein tvvo children sought to recover for injuries
caused by pieces of 'vire in hamburger, or ground steak,
sold by defendant to their mother. The trial court directed verdicts for defendant .and on appeal this was reversed, holding that it was a question for the jury whether
or not the wire got into the hamburger while defendant
'vas processing it. The court stated:
"And from the evidence that each of the plaintiffs was injured by a piece of wire in the very
first mouthful of steak taken by each, it could be
inferred that the entire mass of steak contained
a substantial number of pieces. There wa.s evidence from which it could be inferred that there
was no vvire in the meat when it came into the
store. Hence the jury could find that the wire got
in while the meat was being stored, manufactured
into Hamburg steak and kept for s.ale at the defendant's store under the defendant's exclusive
control. They were not obliged to believe the
testimony of the defendant's manager that it was
impossible for wire to go through the Hamburg
machine, even though this witness was called by
the plaintiffs. ***"
In Turner v. Wilson, 227 S.C. 95, 86 S.E. 2d 867, the
court stated:
"vVhen under the same conditions, several
person.s who have eaten the same food become
similarly ill, inference may be warranted that
food was unwholesome and was cause of illness."
See also Johnson v. Kansavos, 296 Mass. 373, 6 N.E.
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2d 434; Davis v. Van Camp Packing Company, 189 Iowa
775, 176 N.W. 382, 17 A.L.R. 649; Jensen v. Berris, 31
Cal. Ap·p~ 2d 537, 88 P. 2d 220.
Defendant's employees testified that every precaution was taken to eliminate the possibility of sausage
getting into the ground beef. This is routine testimony
in cases of this kind and can only create a conflict in the
evidence as to whether or not trichinae in fact got into
the beef.
In Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687,
163 P. 2d 470, plaintiff had salami and coppe and some
time later came down with trichinosis. The court recognized the fact that in these cases circumstanial evidence
1nust frequently be resorted to and stated the rule as
follows:

"The plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence does not have to preclude the possibility of
all other po.ssible inferences. He simply has to
establish the reasonableness of his inference by
a preponderance of the evidence.''
In that case atten1pt "~as n1ade to sho\v that all precautions were taken and the court stated:
"This evidence is undoubtedly of considerable persuasive force. But as opposed to it are the
facts found by the trial court, and supported by
substantial evidence, that plaintiff 'vife and her
t\vo children beea.1ne ill \vi th trichinosis shortly
after eating the pork in question: that they had
eaten no other pork for a considerable period
prior thereto: and that the n1ain sourc.e of the
infection is diseased pork. It \vas for the trial
court to weigh the evidence. It.s findings, being
supported by substanial eYidence and by reason-
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13
able inferences from the evidence, cannot be disturbed."
In Kline v. Du.chess Sandwich Company, 14 Cal. 2d
2·72, 93 P. 2d 799, proof was introduced that precautions
were taken to prevent any contamination of food from
occurring. It was held, however, that inasmuch as there
was contamination in the food this could only create a
conflict of f.act and in this connection the court stated:
"But in that regard, notwithstanding undisputed evidence to the effect that in the manufacture of sandwiches, generally, care had been
exercised by the said defendant to prevent the
happening of such an incident as befell one of the
plaintiffs in the instant case, nevertheless, from
the admitted f.act that cheeseworms, or 'maggots'
were present on or in the sandwich that was prepared by the defendant Duchess Sandwich Company and thereafter sold by defendant Kilpatrick
to one of the plaintiffs, it becomes undeniable
that at some time or place some person had failed
to exercise the proper degree of c.are to prevent
houseflies or cheese-flies from depositing their
eggs on some of the material from which the
sandwiches were manufactured, or the subsequent
infestation of the particular sandwich in question
by cheese-worms or 'maggots.'
Also, in Gindraux v. Ma.urice Mercantile Co., 4 Cal.
2d 204, 47 P. 2d 708, similar te_stimony was introduced
showing that defendant operated .a sanitary shop and
there was no direct evidence that the salami eaten by
plaintiffs was actually infested with trichina. The trial
court had granted defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in reversing this ruling
the ~ourt stated :
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"There is evidence from which it appears that
the salami was properly manufactured and processed according to federal regulations. When so
treated, the evidence shows that live trichina germs
are destroyed, and cannot again appear in the
prepared product. In this case the salami was
duly inspected and certified by governmental authorities. The premi_ses where the product was
sold were clean and in all respects sanitary, meeting all requirements in that regard. But against
the rather persuasive force of this evidence, the
testimony of the plaintiffs must be considered.
The evidence in support of plaintiffs' case puts in
the record the fact that plaintiffs became infected
with trichinosis within ten days after purchasing
the salami; that they had eaten no pork for a
considerable time prior thereto ; and the testimony
of Dr. 1fonteith and Dr. Alexander that the SYJ.nptoms of infection from that disease usually appear
in from six to ten da-ys, and that the only possible
source of the disease is infected pork. This evidence gives rise to an inference of fact. In countless cases such inference has been deemed sufficient to go to the jur~~. n
Defendant made a valiant, but ineffective, effort to
sho\v that plaintiffs could haYe beeo1ne infested "-ith
trichinae fron1 sources other than the defendant company.
It's main reliance "Tas apparently based on the fact that
there "Tas an epiden1ic of trichinosis an1ong tl1e German
speaking people \Yho had purchased Inett\Yurst fron1 a
1nea t 1narket run by a n1an b~T the na1ne of Suhrmann.
rrhe t()sti.Ill011)T relating to this subject Inatter \Yas clearly
i rrelev.ant. The per.sons \Yho contracted trichinosis fron1
this sonree did not becon1c> siek until so1ne ti1ne in . .-\.ugust,
1955, \vhielt \\Tas over a n1onth after the plaintiffs here
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11!'.
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~

contracted the disease. One of the plaintiffs first became
ill July 3 and the last one became ill July 11th. There
could have been no possible connection between plaintiffs'
trichinosis and Suhrmann's market. True it is that plaintiffs had purchased unsalted butter, eggs and cheese from
Suhrmann's Market, but the evidence was to the effect
that the Niemanns had purchased nothing from Suhrmann since May 1, 1955 (314, 324-326). Hence, the jury
could have found that Suhrmann's could not have been
the source of plaintiffs' illness because two months
elapsed between the time of dealing with Suhrmann's and
the illness of plaintiffs. The testimony was to the effect
that symptoms of trichinosis .show up ordinarily between
seven and fourteen days from ingestion and it might be
as little as two days or as much.as four weeks (246). This
eliminates the te.stimony of Hoffman regarding the use
of the same knife and same show ·case for meats and
cheese (276, 277). In any event, this testimony of Hoffn1an's fell of its own \veight when it appeared th.at he did
not work for Suhrmann's after March of 1955 (278).
No meat was purchased by plaintiffs from this place
(138) until after they were sick and then it was not eaten
by them (142, 160, 172). It was given to the dog (160,
172).
Defendant .also tried to make much of the fact that
. the Niemanns on occasion picked up meat scraps for their
dog and placed it in the refrigerator. The ground beef
did not find its way into the refrigerator before it was
first eaten ( 156, 183).
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These scraps were kept in a sack, were cooked and
placed in the bottom of the refrigerator . They came in
contact with no food (146-149).
Also, defendant contended that plaintiffs ate some
mettwurst which was delivered to them between April
and June. The only mettwurst this could be is that which
was brought to them by Carla Schnibbe. She testified
that she brought it on the lOth day of !tiay (188). The
Niemanns testified that it was some time between the
first and fifteenth of May (155, 178, 184). Even though
this had been infested it would have been eaten at too
remote a time to have caused the sickness of July 3 (211).
There is also the added fact that only part of this stick
of mettwurst was given to the Xiemanns. The other portion was eaten by the Schnibbe family (190) and the
Niemann boy, Niels, also ate this mettwurst (184). No
one in the Schnibbe family were sick from e.ating this
mettwurst (190) and Niels was not sick (178). Mrs. NieJnann's 1nother also ate of this mettwurst and was not
sick (184). This would support a jury finding that this
1nettwurst could not possibly have been the source of
plaintiffs' illness. It did not co1ne fro1n Suhr1nann's (138,
189).
Defendant called Glen Kilpatrick, an e1nployee of
the st8:te to testify that Renate told hun in a con\ersation
in August that the family had mett,Yurst at Bear Lake
( 265). He testified that she stated her brother had purchased this mettwu1~st at Suhrmann's. In the first place,
the tin1e between when this could have been eaten and the
onset of the sympto1ns \V,as too short a tilne and certainly
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would not come within the limits of the usual time for
showing of symptoms. However, it was testified definitely that no such state1nent was made by Renate and that
the Niemann family did not have any mettwurst at Bear
Lake on this trip (312, 314, 317, 323). It was explained
by plaintiff Henri Niemann, the son, that after the family
had become sick, on July 9, 1955, he purchased what is
called in Germany mettwurst but what is called here
salami ( 178, 318).
Counsel for defendant in his brief has seen fit to drag
in by the forelock a number of cases brought against
Suhrmann & Jordan Meat & Livestock Company. These
cases are entirely different from the case now being
considered. They involve persons who contracted trichinosis in August, 1955, and who ate mettwurst purchased
from Suhrmann's the latter part of July or the first part
of August. Plaintiffs here came down with trichinosis
more than a month before the persons involved in the
other c.ases and plaintiffs here did not eat any mettwurst
from Suhrmann's. Plaintiffs contracted trichinosis before any infested mettwurst was sold by Suhrmann as
evidenced by the fact that the persons in those cases were
regular mett1vurst eaters and they ate mettwurst from
Suhrmann's all during the summer months and before,
and did not come down with trichinosis until well into
August. The earliest c.ase there was August 9th. The
evidence in those cases established that the only source
could be mettwurst from Suhrmann's while in the case
at bar the only source could be the ground beef purchased
from defendant. These plaintiffs had not traded at SuhrSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1nann's since before May 1,1955 (315). Other cases have
been filed against the defendant in the case at bar for
selling trichina infested ground beef.
The only case cited by defendant under this point of
his brief is Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Company,
117 Utah 576, 218 P. 2d 660, which involved the
explosion of a coke bottle. In that case it 'vas shown that
many people had access to the bottle from the time it
was delivered by the Coca Cola Bottling Company until
plaintiff sought to open the bottle. In the case at b.ar,
plaintiffs bought the ground beef and immediately took
it home and mixed it into the spread described above.
Plaintiffs here do not rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, we here rely upon a breach of warranty and a
violation of statute.
We submit that under the evidence above set forth
the verdict of the jury is supported by ample evidence
and the trial court properly pernritted the jur~~ to make
a determination of 'vhether or not the ground beef prepared by defendant "~as adulterated and the source of
the trichinosis contracted by these plaintiffs.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION
NO. 5 AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 9.

This ense \vas subn1itted to the jur~~ upon the si1nple
proposition that if defendant sold to plaintiffs ground
beef containing trichinae and this proxi1nately resulted
in plaintiffs contracting trichino~is then defendant \Yas
responsible for any da1nages proxi1nately resulting there-
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from. The jury was so informed by Instructions 3 and
4 (79, 80).
This is a correct statement of the law because if
the beef sold contained trichina it would constitute (1)
a violation of the Utah statutes referring to adulteration
of foods, and ( 2) a breach of warranty. The instructions
would be correct under either, or both, propositions and
hence if one of these propositions is applicable the
instruction is correct.
Defendant is in error when it states that plaintiff
relied solely on Section 60-1-15, Subdivision (1), Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. Plaintiffs relied also upon Subdivision 2 of that se·ction and upon the Utah statutes
prohibiting the sale of adulterated food.
VIOLATION OF ADULTERATION STATUTES
Many courts, including this Court, hold that where
a statute is violated the violator is negligent per se.
Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah 474, 69 P. 2d
502; Wilcox v. Wunderlich, 73 Utah 1, 272 P. 207 ; 38
Am. Jur. 827, Negligence, s,ection 158. This merely means
that upon violation of the statute nothing further need be
shown. If the statute, therefore, does not require by its
terms knowledge on the part of the violator or a lack of
due care to establish liability it i.s unnecessary for a
plaintiff to prove either of such elements.
In Donaldson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
186 Ga. 870, 199 S.E. 213, 128 A.L.R. 456, it was held
that under statutes similar to the Utah statutes that it
was unnecessary to prove either negligence in treating
or knowledge of the adulteration of the food in order to
constitute a violation of the statute and to visit liability
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on the violator. See also the annotations to the same
effect found at 128 A.L.R. 464 and 28 A.L.R. 1384.
The Utah statute Section 4-20-5 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 provides:
"Every person who manufactures for sale,
sells, exchanges or delivers, or offers to sell, exchange or deliver, or has in his possession with
intent to sell, exchange or deliver, any adulterated
or misbranded drug, or article of food, drink,
or confectionery, or wh·o adulterates or misbrands
any article of food, drink, drug or confectionery,
is guilty of a misdemeanor."

S,ection 4-20-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, so far as
material here defines adulteration as follows:
"For the purpose of this chapter an article
shall be deemed to be adulterated:" * * * * *"In
the case of foods:"* * * * (5) "If it contains any
added poisonous or other added deleterious ingredients which may render such article injurious
to health." * * * * (7) "If it consists in whole or
in part of a filthy, decon1posed or putrid animal
or vegetable substance or any portion of any
animal unfit for food ('vhether n1anufactured or
not), or if it is a product of a diseased anintal or
one that has died other,vise than by slaughter."
Trichina could only co1ne fro1n pork. Plaintiffs could
only have contracted trichinosis fron1 eating the ground
beef purchased from defendant. The presence of this
trichina in the ground beef "~as certainly an added
deleterious ingredient "~hirh rendered the beef injuriou~
to health. Also, because of its presence the beef contained a portion of an anilnal unfit for food and this
trichina \vas the product of a diseased anilnal. Hence~
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the proof here established a violation of the statutes of
the State of Utah and under them it was unnecessary
to prove either knowledge or lack of care so far as the
adulteration of the food was concerned. Instructions 3
and 4 were therefore, justified under, these statutes.
In the case of Troietto v. G. H. Hammond Company,
110 F. 2d 135, similar statutes were involved. The trial
court had directed a verdict in favor of defendant and
on appeal this was reversed. The evidence indicated
that plaintiff ate meat halls made from fresh pork and
beef purchased from defendant. As a result he contracted
triehino.sis. The court stated:
"We .are of the opinion that pork that is infected with trichinella is diseased within the
meaning of the Ohio Pure Foods Law. Allen v.
Marvin, 46 Wkly. Law Bul. 208, affirmed, 64
Ohio St. 608, 61 N.E. 1139. Its sale, even when
the seller has no knowledge that it is diseased or
infected, violates the statute and the seller is
negligent in law. Allen v. Marvin, supra; Portage
Markets Co. v. George, 111 Ohio St. 775, 146 N.E.
283; Gre.at Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Hughes,
131 Ohio St. 501, 3 N.E. 2d 415, Cf. Schell v.
DuBois, Adm'r, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664,
L.R.A. 1917A, 710.
"When appellant's testimony was concluded,
there was substantial evidence from which the
jury could have found that appellant's illness
was caused by his eating pork that was infected
with trichinella when sold by appellees; and,
under Ohio law, the court should h.ave instructed
the jury that if they found these facts appellees
were negligent in law. See cases cited above. If
appellees were thus negligent, it appears to be
well settled, under Ohio law, that their negligence
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was the proximate cause of appellant's injury,
even though another's negligence may have contributed thereto."
In Leonardi v. Habermann Provision Co., 143 Ohio
St. 623, 56 N.E. 2d 232, action wa.s brought for damages
resulting from trichinosis and the action was based on
violation of the statute. It was held that neither knowledge nor lack of due care need be proven .and the court
stated:
"The inhibition of the statute against the sale
of unwholesome food or infected meat means that
only wholesome food or uninfected meat may be
lawfully sold. The definition of the term 'wholesome' is 'sound, tending to promote health'; 'uninfected' means untainted or uncontaminated, not
affected unfavorably, not impregnated or permeated with that which is bad or harmful. Trichinae-infected meat does not qualify under these
definitions. If it 'Yere kno·wn that fresh pork offered over the counter for sale "~as infected with
trichinae it 'Yould require much fortitude to assert
that it was wholesome, uninfected and marketable,
even though notice 'Yas given to the purchaser
that all portions of it 1nu.st be sufficiently cooked
to render it har1nless. The fact that it is not
known to be infected at the tin1e of sale does not
render it "~holesome or i1nprove its Inarketability.
The statute, in effect prohibitive rather than
directive, 'vas passed for the purpose of protecting
and safeguarding the lives and health of the
people. In harmony "~ith that purpose, this court
takes the view that absolute liability is cast upon
the defendant as the seller of n1eat infested 'vith
triehinae, 'vithout regard to kno,vledge of its presence. Troietto v. G. H. Han11nond Co., 6 Cir.,
110 F. 2d 135. Any other rule "~ould generally
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leave the injured purchaser, in his effort to place
responsibility, without any practical remedy. This
places a heavy burden upon the seller, but he
Inay require a warranty from the person who sells
the meat to him and is in a position to know
whether the meat has been made safe by refrigeration."
In Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181
P.ac. 326, plaintiff recovered for illness and disability
resulting from eating cooked and spiced pigs' feet sold
by defendant to plaintiff's husband. Under a statute
similar to that of Utah, the judgement for plaintiff was
affirmed and the court stated:
"The s.ale of adulterated food is absolutely
prohibited. The seller is made the insurer of the
purity of food products sold by him, and guilty
knowledge on his part is. no longer an ingredient
of the offense. The obligation imposed by the statute is personal, and cannot be avoided by showing
that the i1npure food was purchased from a foreign concern, and bore the stamp of approval of
the government inspectors."
See also Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co., 138 Ohio
St. 178, 34 N.E. 2d 202; Kurth v. Krumrne, 143 Ohio St.
638, 56 N.E. 2d 227; Flynn v. Growers Outlet, Inc., 307
}[ass. 373, 30 N .E. 2d 250.
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 9 would not
be applicable to the law relating to a violation of statute.
It only purported to relate to a warr.anty situation. It
also was a mandatory instruction for defendant and
\vould have required a verdict for defendant even though
there was a violation statute. On this ground alone the
trial court properly rejected this requested instruction.
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It is submitted that under the foregoing authorities
the sale of beef with trichina infested pork constituted
a violation of the foregoing Utah statutes and the violation of these statutes, without more, was a basis for
liability and responsibility for any damages proximately
resulting from such violation.

BREACH OF WARRANTY
Plaintiffs in this case also relied upon the lTtah
Statutes relating to implied warranties which so far as
material here, provide as follows (Section 60-1-15, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953):
"Implied warranties of quality. - Subject to
the provisions of this title and of any statute in
that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for an:~ particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract
to sell or a sale, except as follows :
" ( 1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular
purpose for which the goods are required, and it
appears that the buyer relies on the seller"s skill
or judgn1ent ('Yhether he is the grower or manufacturer or not)~ there is an in1plied ",.arranty that
the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose:
2) ,,~here the goods are bought by description from a seller ",.ho deals in goods of
that description (",.hether he is the grower or
1nanufacturer or not)~ there is an iinplied 'Yarranty that the goods shall be of 111erchantable
quality.''
H

(

Man~,.

cases hold 'Yithout particular reference to
any statute that ",.here food is sold for consu1nption,
such ~ale carrie~ 'vith it an implied "'"arranty that the
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food is wholesome .and fit for human consumption. This
warranty is based upon public policy requiring protection
to members of the public eating food provided by persons
who make a business of manufacturing, preparing or
selling such food. A good example is Decker & Sons v.
Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828, 142 A.L.R. 1479.
Suit was brought for damages resulting from eating
sausage which was manufactured and sold under the
trade name of "Cerfalet." In upholding plaintiff's verdict
the court stated:
"After h.aving considered the matter most
carefully, we have reached the conclusion that the
1nanufacturer is liable for the injurie.s sustained
by the consumers of the products in question.
''We think the manufacturer is liable in such
a case under an implied warranty imposed by
operation of law as a matter of public policy. We
recognize that the authorities are by no means
uniform, but we believe the better reasoning supports the rule which holds the manufacturer liable.
Liability in such ease is not based on negligence,
nor on a breach of the usual implied contractual
warr.anty, but on the broad principle of the public
policy to protect human health and life. It is a
well-known fact that articles of food are manufactured and placed in the channels of commerce,
with the intention that they shall pass from hand
to hand until they .are finally used by some remote
consumer. It is usually impracticable, if not inlpossible, for the ultimate consumer to analyze the
food and a.scertain whether or not it is suitable
for human consumption. Since it has been packed
and placed on the market as a food for hum.an
consumption, and marked as such, the purchaser
usually eats it or causes it to be served to his

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
family without the precaution of having it analyzed by a technician to ascertain whether or not
it is suitable for human consumption. In fact,
in most instances the only satisfactory examination that could be made would be only at the time
and place of the processing of the food. It seems
to be the rule that where food products sold for
human consumption are unfit for that purpose,
there is such an utter failure of the purpose for
which the food is sold, and the consequences of
eating unsound food are so disastrous to human
health and life, that the law imposes a warranty
of purity in favor of the ultimate consumer as a
matter of public policy.
"Since very early times the common la"~ has
applied more stringent rules to sales of food than
to sales of other 1nerchandise. It has long been
a well-established rule that in sales of food for
domestic use there is an implied warranty that
it is wholesome and fit for human consumption.
Race v. Krum, 222 KY ±10, 118 XE 853, LRA
1918F 1172; "'\\T eiden1an v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49
KE 210; Houston Cotton Oil Co. '· Tramn1ell
( Tex CiY A pp) 72 S\\... 2-!-!: 55 CJ 76-!: 2± RCL
195; 37 Tex Jur 299 ..A_ Inajorit~- of the Alneriean
courts that haYe follo\ved this holding ha\e not
based such "Tarrant~~ upon an in1plied tern1 in the
contract behYeen buyer and seller, nor upon any
reliance b~~ the buyer on the representation of
the seller, but haYe ilnposed it a.s a 1natter of
public poliey in order to discourage the sale of
Ull\\Tholeso1ne food.
H

AnothPr out~ tanding ea~e on this subject is Tf'" eideJnan ,r. ]( cll~c r, 171 Ill. 93, --l-9 N.E. :?10, \vherein the action
was prPdicated on a breach of ilnplied \Yarranty to re-
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cover damages for illness from trichinosis. The court
stated:
"Where, however, articles of food are purchased from a retail dealer for immediate consumption, the consequences resulting from the
purchase of an unsound article may be so serious
and may prove so disastrous to the health and life
of the consumer that public safety demands that
there should be an implied warranty on the part
of the vendor that the article sold is sound and
fit for the use for which it was purchased. It
may be said that the rule is a harsh one; but, as
a general rule, in the sale of provisions the
vendor has so many more· facilities for ascertaining the soundness or unsoundness of the article offered for sale than are possessed by the
purchaser, that it is much safer to hold the vendor
liable than it would be to compel the purchaser
to assume the risk. Moreover, we have a statute
which makes it a crime for any per.son to sell
or offer to sell, or keep for sale, flesh of any
dise·ased animal.''
In N,elson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 vVa.sh. 2d 284,
105 P. 2d 76, the court stated:
"Where articles of food are sold for domestic
use and immediate consumption, the law implies
a warranty that such articles are sound, wholesome, and fit to be consumed, and if the consumer
is made sick through the consumption of such
food, he has a right of action against the vendors
thereof, either for breach of implied warranty,
or for negligence; and in such action it is unnecessary either to allege or to prove scienter. Mazetti
v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633, 48
L.R.A., (N.S.) 213, Ann. Cas. 1915C·, 140; Flessher
v. Carstens Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 160 P. 14;
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Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775,
176 N.W. 382,17 A.L.R. 649.
"This subject has been frequently dealt with
by the various courts of this country, with the
result, as stated in the annotation (supplementing
City of New Orleans v. Vinci, 153 La. 528, 96 So.
110), appearing in 28 A.L.R. at page 1385, that
'By the great weight of authority, the seller is
under the duty of ascertaining at his peril whether
an article of food conforms to the standard
fixed by statute or ordinance; and the validity
of regulations which, in express terms or b~~ construction, dispense with scienter as a condition
of the offense, is almost uniform!~~ held or assmned.'"
Our lltah court in an action which arose prior to
the enactment of the l-:-niform Sales Act, held that such
an implied warranty exists in the sale of food. In Walters
v. United Grocery Co., 51 lTtah 565, 172 Pac. -!73, plaintiff purchased fron1 defendant certain prepared foods
such as potato salad and other edibles for immediate
table con.sumption .and plaintiff bec~nne ill fro1n eating
the food. A judginent for plaintiff 'Yas affirmed. Plaintiff did not prove that defendant "~as negligent in the
preparation of the potato salad and so the question +o
be determined by the court "~as "~hether the fact alone
that the salad "~as stale and not fit for hun1an consumption "~ould entitle plaintiff to recoYer. The court stated:
"'"Vhile the authorities are not uniforin~ and
there does not see1n to be any "~ell-defined universal rule governing the liabilitY of Yendors in
the sale of food of all kinds for h"un1an consun1pti.on, still I think it is fairly deducible fro1n the
adjudicated cases, "'here the facts are such as
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in the case at bar, that the vendor must be held
liable when injury results from the consumption
of such food."
The court also stated :
"But, as indicated, the weight of authority
is to the effect that in a case such as the one
under consideration, where the seller h.as prepared
the goods, and there is nothing in the appearance
of the goods or the odor to indicate- either to
the seller or to the buyer that the combination
is not fit for human consumption, the seller is
liable. The opportunities and means of knowing
the contents of the different ingredients that go
to make up the salad, and the sources from which
such ingredients are obtained, .are exclusively in
his possession and knowledge, and cannot in any
way be known to the purchaser. True, the food
was seen by the purchaser, plaintiff herein, as
well as the defendant; but, as stated, there was
nothing about its appe.arance to indicate its impurity. Not only was the means of knowing the
impurity of the food within the knowledge of
the compounder and seller of such food, but it
seems that he ought to be charged 'vith the responsibility for the injury resulting, for the
reasons indicated."
The court quoted with approval Weideman v. K,eller,
supra, as follows :
"As a general rule, we think the decided
weight of authority in the United States is that,
on all sales of meats or provisions for immediate
domestic use by a retail dealer, there is an implied warranty of fitness and wholesomeness for
consumption.''
~fany ca.ses rule with plaintiff on the grounds that
there is an implied warranty that the goods are reason-
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ably fit for the purpose for which they are purchased.
Subdivision ( 1) of the implied warranty st.a tute requires
that the seller either expressly or by implication kno'v
the purpose for which the goods are purchased and the
buyer must rely on the .seller's skill and judgment. In
these cases a person selling food for human consumption
knows the food will be used for that purpose and naturally the buyer relies upon the skill and judgment of
the seller to produce or sell the type of merchandise
which will be suitable for the purpose of human consumption. Particularly is this true in the situation presented by the case at bar. The ground beef "~as ground
by defendant and placed on its display shelves in packages for persons to pick up, buy and eat. Defendant
knew that the meat would be purchased for human consumption. Inasmuch as this ground beef \Yas packaged~
of necessity the buyer relied upon the skill and judgment
of the defendant in furnishing "~holesome food. It would
be impossible for the customers to determine in a case
like the one at bar "~hether or not the n1eat was wholesoine. Customers are not ordinarily experts in deternlining the .,v~oleso1neness of n1eat and n1ust rely, as did
plaintiffs, upon the skill and judg1nent of defendant.
The 1neat "~.as in a package and could not be exan1ined.
It 'viii not do to saY
. that under ordinarY. and usual
circu1nstanees ground beef is sold to be both cooked
and eaten. In the first place, the purpose of the purchase
was for hu1nan consun1ption and if this beef contained
trichina loaded .sausage it ",.ould not 1neet tl1at requirellten t. There is no reason to assm11e that this ground
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beef would not be eaten raw or would be cooked to the
extent that any trichina contained therein would be killed.
To eat this as a spread is one of the ways ground beef
is used. Particularly do Germans eat it this way (147,
148, 170). Certainly many people like rare ground beef
just as they like rare prime rib. There could be no assumption on the part of defendant or any requirement
on the part of plaintiffs that this ground beef should
be cooked sufficiently to kill trichina. We are not dealing
\vith a situation vvhere the sale is of r.aw pork. This
was a sale of ground beef which turned out to have in
it some sausage.
There are cases holding because of the fact that raw
pork is sometimes infested with trichinae the warranty
with its sale is that it is fit for human consumption
when properly cooked. Defendant has cited these cases,
Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N.W. 414
and Feinstein v. Reeves, 14 F. Supp. 167. There are cases
holding the contrary even in pork cases. McSpedon v.
K unz, 271 N. Y. 131, 2 N.E. 2d 513, 105 A.L.R. 1497;
Greco v. J( resg,e Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E. 2d 557, 115
.A.. L.R. 1020.
In the McSpedon case, supra, the court supports its
ruling by the following reasoning:
HThis requisite of thorough heating and the
nature of trichinae may see1n very simple things
to us and to experts who are dealing with these
1natters daily, but there are many people in this
country who know nothing about trichinosis or
the danger lurking in meats or the requisite heating point to destroy para.sites, and who must
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rely, and do rely, upon the grocer and the butcher
and such reputable concerns as Armour & Co.
to sell them wholesale food.
"This is the reason why we said in the
Rinaldi Case that on every such sale of food by
a dealer for immediate human consumption there
is an implied warranty of its wholesomeness.

* * *"
This is not a case involving the sale of pork and as
said in Mouren v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 139
N.Y.S. 2d 375:
"When a purchaser of pork knows he is buying pork, he can protect himself from the infection
by thoroughly cooking the meat. Not knowing
there was pork in the meat, it was cooked as
hamburger and served rare on Saturday on which
the meat wa.s purchased and on the following
day."
The reason for the rule announced in the pork cases
holding the warranty is that the pork is wholeson1e only
when properly cooked i.s obviously not present in a ground
beef sale. There is no reason to protect against trichinae
in beef and no need to cook it either at all or sufficiently
to kill trichinae. Hence defendant's R.equested Instruction No. 9 \Yould be inapplicable to this case. The warrant~,. \Yas that the beef "-as fit for hun1an consun1ption
and it \vas not lilnited to a situation " . here cooked to
eliminate trichinae.
The follo\\-.. ing cases hold under a statute si.Inilar to
the above quoted SubdiYision (1) that "'"here food is sold
for hlunan eonslunption there "'"ill be in1plied a \varranty
that such food is \Vholeso1ne .and reasonably fit for hu1nan
consnn1pti.on: Ill cSpcdon Y. J(uJl.:·, 271 N.l~. 131, ~ X.E. 2d
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513, 105 A.L.R. 1497; Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal.
.._t\.pp. 2d 687, 163 P. 2d -±70; Kline v. Duchess Sandwich
Company, 14 Cal. 2d272, 93 P. 2d 799; Jensenv. Berris, 31
Cal. App. 2d 537, 88 P. 2d 220; Gindraux v. Mau.rice Mercantile Co., 4 Cal. 2d 204, 47 P. 2d 708; Charlis v. Hartloff,
136 Kan. 823, 18 P. 2d 199; Swengel v. F & E Wholesale
Grocery, 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. 2d 930; Rinaldi v. Mohican
Co., 225 N.Y. 70, 121 N.E. -±71; Greco v. K r,esge Co., 277
N.Y. 26, 12 N.E. 2d 557, 115 A.L.R. 1020; Ward v. Great
.Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225,
5 A.L.R. 242; Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249,
161 Atl. 385, 90 A.L.R. 1260.
In the Rinaldi case, supra, the court stated:
"We think that the mere purchase by a customer from a retail dealer in foods of an .article
ordinarily used for human consumption does by
implication make known to the vendor the purpose
for which the article is required. Such a transaction standing by itself permits no contrary inferences. In this we agree with the courts of
Massachusetts. Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co.,
198 Mass. 271-279, 21 Am. Neg. Case. 142, 84 N.EI
481, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 884, 126 Am. St. Rep. 436,
15 Ann. Cas. 1076. But we think, further, that
such a purchase, where the buyer may assume
that the seller has the opportunity to examine the
article sold, unexplained, is also conclusive evidence of reliance on the seller's skill or judgment.''
In the Sw,engel case, supra, the court stated:
"We think that a Inerchant, in displaying article.s of food for sale, impliedly warrants that each
and all of the articles are fit, whether of well
known or little known brands, or whether packaged
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or not, and that the fact the purchaser chooses
one or the other should not relieve the dealer. And
if the dealer is liable, under the circumstances instant in this case, so are the intermediate handlers."
We submit that under the evidence and these authorities the defendant knew that the ground beef was to be
used for human consumption and the plaintiffs relied
upon the skill and judgment of the defendant in providing
this packaged ground beef in a display counter and from
this there was an implied warranty that the ground beef
was fit for human consumption and that this was breached
by defendant.
Some cases hold that where food is purchased the
implied warranty is not created by Subdivision (1), but
is by Subdivision (2). One of the outstanding cases on
this phase of the la"'" is Ryan v. Progressh·e Grocery
Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N".E. -±85, 7-± A.L.R. 339.
Plaintiff sued for breach of "~.arranty. He bought through
his "rife as his agent, a loaf of bread "\Yhich had a pin
concealed in it and "\Yhich i1ijured plaintiffs 1nouth. \\'hen
the "Tife purchased the bread she asked the clerk for a
loaf of '"\\'.ard~s Bread.~' The court held that there 'yas
no implied "Tarranty that the goods "\Yould be reasonably
fit for the purpose purchased because there 'Yas no reliance by the 'vife on the skill or judgn1ent of defendant.
Ho"TPver, in surh event the goods "Tere purchased by deHeri ption and hence there "Tas an ilnplied "\Yarr.anty of
1nerehantabilitY
. 'vhich "Tas breached bv. the sale of a loaf
of bread containing a pin. In the case at b.ar if for any
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reason there is no warranty under the Subdivision (1),
then there is one under Subdivision (2).
In the case at bar there was a sale of ground beef by
defendant to plaintiffs under .a label of ground beef, but
it was not as described or represented because it contained pork with trichina, and such beef could not be considered merchantable, or as it is defined, "saleable.'' See
Wallace v. L.D. Clark &Son, 740kla. 208,174 Pac. 557,
~1

A.L.R. 361; annotation at 21 A.L.R. 367.

In the Ryan case, the court recognized that a case
n1ay come under both subdivisions. The court stated:
.. Most of the sales of defective food stuffs
have been dealt with by the courts .as if subdivision 1 of the section defining warranties gave the
exclusive rule to be applied. In some instances
the goods were not purchased by description. In
others, the courts may have been unmindful of the
fact that the warranty of merchantable quality is
no longer confined to manufacturers or growers.
Innov.ation.s of this order are slow to make their
vvay. Gradually, however, as the statute has become better known, the bearing of subdivision 2
upon sales of food in sealed containers has been
perceived by court and counsel. The nature of the
transaction must determine in each instance the
rule to be applied. There are times when .a warranty of fitness has no relation to a warranty of
merchantable quality. This is so, for example.,
when machinery competently wrought is still inadequate for the use to which the buyer has given
notice that it is likely to be applied. There are
times, on the other h.and, when the warranties,
coexist, in which event a recovery may be founded
upon either. 'Fitness for a particular purpose
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may be merely the equivalent of merchantability.~
Williston, Sales, vol. 1 § 235, and cases there cited.
"A dual warranty is thus possible for foodstuffs as for anything else. Both in this court and
in others the possibility is recognized."
Here ag.ain under a warranty of merchantability
defendant's Requested In_struction No.9 was inapplicable
and erroneous. This warranty is not based upon its use.
The sole question is whether beef containing trichinae
infested pork is merchantable or saleable. This requires
an emphatic "no" answer and whether cooked or not
cooked in preparation for human consumption the warranty is breached when it is sold.
We subn1it that under these authorities there was
an implied warranty that the beef \Vas 'vholesoEle an~
re.asonably fit for human eonsumption and also that said
beef was merchantable. That the beef contained pork "Tith
trichina constituted a breach of these warranties and
justified the trial court in sub1nitting the case to the jury
on strict liability. If the jury found that the beef contained trichina which caused plaintiffs to suffer trichinosis then the verdict "\V.as properly for plaintiffs.

DEFENDANT'S AUTHORITIES
The three authorities cited by defendants are not
concerned with a situation involYing the sale of beef containing trichina. Two of the cases relate to a sale of pork
products. In Chez.i v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 1\Iich. 690,
255 N.W. 414, plaintiff sought to recover both on negligence and breach of "\Yarranty. He "\Yas not pern1itted
to recover on either. He did not prove negligence and
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the court held there was no implied warranty that pork
is fit for human consumption in a raw state. We are not
concerned with that situation. There is no reason why
there should be no warranty that beef is fit for human
consumption in a raw state. Beef is often eaten rare
and need not be cooked to the extent that trichinae would
be killed. There is no reason for a person not to eat
raw beef, whereas in cases of pork the presence of trichina in raw pork, in some instances, h.as caused courts to
say there is no warranty while in a raw state. However,
there are many cases contrary to this Michigan ca.Se and
1nany cases where recovery has been .allowed where the
plaintiff ate raw pork. They hold it is sold for food and
hence should not contain anything which might be injurious to health. There is no danger in eating raw ground
beef unless there is some type of adulteration such as
was found in the case at b.ar.
Feinstein v. Reeves, 14 Fed. Sup. 167, is distinguishable on the same grounds as the Cheli case.
Bennett v. Pilot Products Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 P.
2d 525, deals with a situation where plaintiff was allergic
to a hair preparation. It appe.ared that most people
could use that preparation with safety, but it was not
true with plaintiff. The case at bar is not one where
certain people only are allergic to trichina. Anyone who
becomes infested with this worm will get trichinosis. We
submit that none of plaintiff's cases are in point here.
CONCLUSION
The testimony in this case raised a factual question
as to whether or not the beef purchased from defendant
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contained sausage with trichinae and whether plaintiffs
contracted trichinosis from this source. These questions
of fact were properly submitted to the jury under legally
correct Instructions No. 3 .and 4. This is established
under Point I of this brief.
Under Point II it appears that the matter was properly submitted to the jury on the basis of strict liability.
If the facts were established as set forth under Point
I then defendant would be responsible regardless of what
care it used or what knowledge it had. It was both a
violation of statute and a breach of implied warranty
to sell beef adulterated with sausage containing trichina.
We submit that the judgment in favor of plaintiff should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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